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WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
The court denied relief, pointing out that on the face of it the ac-
tion of the board was perfectly legal. The pre-emptive rights of the
majority were not violated inasmuch as the pre-emptive rights were
waived by the articles. In addition, the articles gave the board the
power to issue new shares and to fix the sales price. The court, tacitly
approving of the director who purchased the new issue voting on the
resolution, held that there was no fraud, since an outside appraiser
had valued the shares at $37.50. The court's analysis thus far seems
correct. However, there is one additional fact which might have jus-
tified a different result. The court mentions that one of the majority
group had offered $40.00 per share for the new issue, or $2.50 per
share more than the sales price. If this was a valid offer which was
before the board at the time of the sale it would seem to be a breach
of fiduciary duty for the board to accept a lower offer. The board
owed an obligation to all of the shareholders and to the corporation
to get the best price possible on a new issue of shares. Several cases
from outside of Ohio have held that directors are under a fiduciary
duty not to manipulate share issues for the benefit of any one group
of shareholders.9
Whether the decision was right or wrong, the fact situation clearly
illustrates the following points:
1. As a practical matter, in a closely held corporation, pre-emptive
rights should not be waived in advance.
2. A majority group of shareholders should keep control over a
majority of the board, or their voting control may prove worthless.
3. In a situation such as the above case, where the majority of the
board is in opposition, the new issue might be blocked by prompt self-
help. The majority group could call a special shareholders meeting on
as little as seven days notice.'0 The majority could then oust the entire
board without assigning cause,1 ' and elect a new board at the same meet-
ing. By the use of cumulative voting,' 2 the majority group would then
be able to elect three members of the five-man board.
HUGH ALAN Ross
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
During the past year, Ohio courts made notable contributions to
the criminal law in cases arising out of the operation of motor ve-
hicles. Returning to his home from a trial at which he was convicted
on the charge of driving while intoxicated, William Mingo was
9. Schwab v. Schwab-Wilson Mach. Corp., 13 Cal. App. 2d 1, 55 P.2d 1268 (1936); Ross
Transport, Inc. v. Crothers, 185 Md. 573, 45 A.2d 267 (1946); Elliott v. Baker, 194 Mass.
518, 80 N.E. 450 (1907); Dunlay v. Avenue M Garage & Repair Co., 253 N.Y. 274, 170
N.E. 917 (1930).
10. OHIO REV. CODE § 1701.40(A) (3), .41(A) (Supp. 1959).
11. OHIO REV. CODE § 1701.58(C) (Supp. 1959).
12. OHIO REV. CODE § 1701.55 (C), (D) (Supp. 1959).
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stopped, arrested, and jailed for driving through a red light. He
sought dismissal on the ground that he was privileged from arrest
under Ohio Revised Code section 2331.11, which grants such a privi-
lege to "suitors .. .and witnesses while going to, attending, or re-
turning from court." The supreme court modified a previous deci-
sion 1 and ruled that section 2331.11 applies only to civil arrest and
does not immunize witnesses, attorneys, or parties from arrest for
crimes or misdemeanors while going to or coming from court.' The
basis for the court's ruling was its interpretation of Ohio Revised
Code section 2331.13. This section, which provides that "sections
2331.11 to 2331.14, inclusive, of the Revised Code do not extend to
cases of treason, felony or breach of the peace .... ." was held to en.
compass all criminal cases and proceedings, and thus to exclude from
the privilege all arrests and prosecutions for criminal offenses.
Two further matters involving traffic violations are worthy of
mention. In the first case,4 a citation issued by a policeman to a
motorist was found to be an inadequate statement of the charge. The
citation read "unsafe operation 4511.20 .. . 60/50 m.p.h." The
court considered the charge a "cryptic notation.., understandable to
members of the enforcement agency involved and without real mean-
ing to anyone else." 5  The court further found the command to the
motorist to appear at a certain time and date "and stand trial" to be
an abuse of process when the officer knew that forty other motorists
would be present at the same time, making a trial an impossibility. In
the second matter,' the supreme court resolved that the demonstra-
tion by independent expert testimony of the function and reliability of
speed meters is unnecessary to support the introduction of the speed
recorded on the meter of a radar device in a prosecution on a speed-
ing charge. While disposing of this issue, Judge Bell raised, but did
not consider, a potential problem: May an officer make an arrest
without a warrant in reliance only upon information radioed by the
officer in the radar car, when Ohio Revised Code section 2935.03
authorizes such an arrest of a person found violating a law?
Finally, the use of "vile and offensive" language by a citizen when
forcibly detained by three plainclothesmen was held not to constitute
disorderly conduct.' Guidotti, who had "committed no offense prior
to his detention ... was justified in resisting them [the plainclothes-
men] by any manner or means which may have been reasonably neces-
sary to retain his freedom.""
1. Zumsteg v. American Food Club, Inc., 166 Ohio St. 439, 143 N.E.2d 701 (1957).
2. City of Akron v. Mingo, 169 Ohio St. 254, 160 N.E.2d 225 (1959).
3. For a further discussion of this case, see Civil Procedure section, p. 351 sapra.
4. State v. Wheeler, 157 NXE.2d 763 (Ohio Munic. Ct. 1958).
5. Id. at 765.
6. City of East Cleveland v. Ferrell, 168 Ohio St. 298, 154 N.E.2d 630 (1958).
7. City of Columbus v. Guidotri, 160 NXE.2d 355 (Ohio Ct. App. 1958).
8. Id. at 357.
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CONFLICTS
The hierarchical structure of government in the United States is
conducive to conflicts of jurisdiction and applicable law. Two such
problems were faced by Ohio courts this past year. In the first case,9
the court found that a grand jury might indict a defendant although
a charge for the same offense was pending in a municipal court, in
which proceeding the accused had entered a plea of not guilty and
had requested a jury trial. The court reasoned that Ohio Revised
Code section 2939.08, commanding the grand jury to "inquire of and
present all offenses committed within the county," is without restric-
tion.
A second clash involved a municipal ordinance and a statute. The
supreme court nullified a municipal ordinance which made the offense
of carrying a concealed weapon a misdemeanor since it was in con-
flict with Ohio Revised Code section 2923.01, which made the act a
felony.10 Declaring that a municipality "may not validly contravene
a statutory enactment of general application throughout the state,"'"
the court reasoned that:
Although the ordinance in issue does not permit what the statute
prohibits, and vice versa, it does contravene the expressed policy of the
state with respect to crimes .... Conviction of a misdemeanor entails
relatively minor consequences, whereas, the commission of a felony
carries with it penalties of a severe and lasting character. 12
"THE MOVING FINGER WRITES . . ."
In a court of appeals decision,' 3 it was declared that a party may
not enter a plea of guilty in the hope of gaining the compassion of
the court and then seek to withdraw it for the first time subsequent
to the imposition of sentence. Said the court:
... Where it appears that defendant was not misled .... was fully
advised of his right to a jury trial, was advised of the charge and the
penalty... the administration of justice does not countenance the right
of a person who formally declares his guilt to gamble with fate ......
MENS REA
Ohio's formidable array of liquor laws received added sustenance
in 1959 through a decision of the supreme court. 5 The tribunal de-
termined that since Ohio Revised Code section 4301.22(B) makes
9. State v. Karr, 161 N.E.2d 559 (Ohio C.P. 1959).
10. City of Cleveland v. Betts, 168 Ohio St. 386, 154 N.E.2d 917 (1958).
11. Id. at 388, 154 N.E.2d at 918 (citing OHIO CONsT. art. XVIII, § 3).
12. Id. at 389, 154 N.E.2d at 919. For a further discussion, see Municipal Corporations sec-
tion, p. 410 infra.
13. State v. Gardner, 158 N.E.2d 413 (Ohio Ct. App. 1958).
14. Id. at 416.
15. State v. Morello, 169 Ohio St. 213, 158 N.E.2d 525 (1959).
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no reference to scienter, one may be convicted of the offense of sell-
ing intoxicants to one already intoxicated, without proof of knowl-
edge of the person's intoxication. In so holding, the court overruled
an early case 6 which had imposed the necessity of proof of knowledge
of the state of intoxication, or of the habit of intoxication, as a con-
dition precedent to conviction, although no proof of this nature was
required by the statute. The court stated that the requirement of
scienter was no longer "within the spirit of the present liquor control
laws ... [which were] intended to inflict the penalty, irrespective of
the knowledge or motives" of the violator.17  In a concurring opin-
ion,18 Mr. Justice Taft demonstrated that the rule making scienter a
necessary element had for many years been ignored by Ohio courts of
appeals and was in conflict with a later supreme court pronounce-
ment '9 that the legislature could make the doing of an act a crime
without the element of knowledge.
In contrast to the foregoing, intent was considered essential by a
municipal court which found that the intent to do a civil wrong can-
not be made the basis of the presumption of criminal intent.20  Act-
ing on the instructions of his employer, the defendant destroyed iden-
tification tags supplied by a rival refuse collector, and placed on garb-
age cans by their owners. In acquitting defendant of a charge of mali-
cious mischief,2 ' the court, citing a Victorian English case,22 stated
that "to constitute a crime there must be a criminal act plus criminal
intent, concurring at the time of commission." '23 Where but in the
law can a backwater run at odds with the mainstream?
APPEALS
That judges feel compelled to follow the letter of the law despite
the results is illustrated by a recent municipal court case in which a
judge found the out-of-season mercy killing of an injured fox squirrel
to be a violation of the game laws "without bringing in the moral as-
pect of his deed ....
The previous case is a prologue to the issues raised by two ap-
peals cases: the degree to which a court of appeals will reconsider the
facts found by the trial court, and the flexibility or stringency with
which the court will apply the law to these facts.
16. Miller v. State, 3 Ohio St. 476 (1854).
17. State v. Morello, 169 Ohio St. 213, 216, 158 N.E.2d 525, 528 (1959).
18. Id. at 217, 158 N.E.2d at 529 (concurring opinion).
19. State v. Kelly, 54 Ohio St. 166, 43 N.E. 163 (1896).
20. State v. Wonder, 155 N.E.2d 734 (Ohio Munic. Ct. 1957).
21. Orio REv. CODE § 2909.01.
22. Regina v. Franklin, 15 Cox Crim. Cas. 163 (Sussex Assizes 1883).
23. State v. Wonder, 155 NE.2d 734, 736 (Ohio Munic. Ct. 1957).
24. State v. Hoaglin, 160 N.E.2d 440, 441 (Ohio Munic. Ct. 1959).
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The first case 25 was an appeal on law from a conviction of the
charge of sodomy.26 The court of appeals found that the defendant
was legally convicted "upon the uncorroborated testimony of a wit-
ness who participated with the defendant in the criminal act
charged. ' 27 The conviction was founded upon the testimony of four
delinquent youths, one of whom had participated in the robbery of
the accused's gasoline station. The youths testified that each was a
"willing accomplice to the crime of sodomy with the defendant." 2
The court alluded to the fact that the defendant, "a man with such
an excellent social background, a former soldier who served his coun-
try with distinction in World War II, and the head of a splendid fam-
ily.. ."2' may have been "framed" by the delinquents. However, the
"Court of Appeals in its review of a case on questions of law can look
only to the record presented to it from the lower court. It must draw
the line between trying the facts and determining the credibility of
witnesses, and passing upon the record as a matter of law."30 A dis-
senting judge, citing the principle that an accomplice's testimony is
subject to grave suspicion, indicated that in his opinion the evidence
was not credible and did not support a conviction.31
In contrast with this case was an appeal on law by an eighteen
year old youth from West Virginia who was convicted of two counts
of murder in the first degree 2 for his participation in a robbery
which terminated in the killing of the apprehending police officer by
one of his accomplices. 3  The skeletal facts are that the defendant,
Milam, was awakened by Davis and Lyons, with whom he had played
poker on previous occasions, and was asked to go with them to re-
cover money lost at cards. They had discovered that their host on
these occasions, Buchanan, had cheated and played with marked
cards. Upon arriving, Davis and Lyons proceeded to rob the Bu-
chanans of money and valuables. Milam passively participated by
picking up a revolver found on the premises and carrying both the
gun and the money from the building. The three drove away in
Milam's car. A short distance from the scene of the robbery, they
were detained by Lieutenant Lentz. Milam stopped the car and re-
mained with it. Lyons attempted to escape and shot Lentz to death
when accosted by him.
25. State v. Harmon, 107 Ohio App. 268, 158 N.E.2d 406 (1958).
26. OHIO REV. CODE § 2905.44.
27. State v. Harmon, 107 Ohio App. 268, 158 N.E.2d 406 (1958) (syllabus 1).
28. Id. at 269, 158 N.E.2d at 408.
29. Id. at 273, 158 N.E.2d at 410.
30. Id. at 271, 158 N.E.2d at 409.
31. Id. at 274, 158 N.E.2d at 410 (dissenting opinion).
32. The first count was for the killing of a person while in the perpetration of a robbery,
OHIO REV. CODE § 2901.01; the second count was for the killing of a policeman while in
the discharge of his duties, OHIO REV. CODE § 2901.04.
33. State v. Milam, 108 Ohio App. 254, 156 N.E.2d 840 (1959).
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The court characterized Milam "as a guileless tyro of metropoli-
tan life who unwittingly associated himself with some villainous char-
acters.""- The court commented, as in the previous case, that his
family life was satisfactory and that he had had no previous criminal
record. The majority then resolved that Milam "was a mere spec-
tator" to the robbery, and that he was drawn into going with Davis
and Lyons. The court concluded, "the record tends to show that
the defendant did not participate in the robbery of his own volition
but because of a well-grounded apprehension of present imminent and
impending death or serious bodily injury at the hands of ... [Davis
and Lyons] if he did not . . . [and] that he seized the first oppor-
tunity reasonably safe for him to desist from such participation
Construing the fact that he did not attempt to flee from
Lentz, the court added, "the law should ... permit the inference that
a person refusing to flee from crime, though opportunity offers, does
so because of no consciousness of guilt." 6 The court found that the
triers of fact had failed to pass upon the questions of whether Milam
had submitted to arrest, and, if so, whether his submission terminated
his participation in the conspiracy prior to the killing of Lentz. The
court held that the omission was error prejudicial to the substantial
rights of Milam, justifying reversal.
A dissenting judge came to a different conclusion regarding the
facts.3 7 The judge indicated that in Ohio, the burden is on the de-
fendant to prove duress by a preponderance of the evidence when it
is proved that defendant was present -at the time and place of the
crime and participated in the robbery. The judge continued:
At no place in the evidence does the defendant say or act in such a way
or fashion as to indicate a withdrawal of support from the robbery,
nor is there any evidence that his co-conspirators threatened his physical
safety if he attempted a withdrawal. ... The claim that this defendant
acted in fear (which is not a legal defense) is almost completely de-
stroyed by his own testimony and police statement.38
The judge concluded that under Ohio law39 an escape following the
perpetration of a crime does not terminate the crime, and that a killing
committed during the escape, although not part of the original plan,
is a part of the res gestae of the crime. The dissent concluded that
Milam remained a co-conspirator at the time of the shooting and was
properly found guilty of the murder. 0
34. Id. at 264, 156 N.E.2d at 846.
35. Id. at 265, 156 NXE.2d at 846.
36. Ibid.
37. State v. Milam, 108 Ohio App. 254, 276, 156 N.E.2d 840, 853 (1959) (dissenting
opinion).
38. Id. at 285, 156 N.E.2d at 858 (dissenting opinion).
39. State v. Habig, 106 Ohio St. 151, 140 N.E. 195 (1922).
40. Subsequent to the completion of this article, Milam was acquitted of the charges against
him. State v. Milan, 163 N.E.2d 416 (Ohio C.P. 1959). [Ed.]
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